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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996 Supp.).

Following

transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW.

1.

Did the District Court correctly find that Appellant Roger

T. Russell ("Russell") was neither a "judgment debtor" or a "successor
in interest to the judgment debtor" within the meaning of Rule 69,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore lacked the capacity to
redeem parcels of real property which Appellee Mark L. Rindlesbach
("Rindlesbach") had purchased at a sheriff's sale?
2.

Did Evan W. Hansen

("Evan") bind Drew William Hansen

("Drew") and Diana M. Hansen ("Diana") when he allegedly entered into
an oral agreement with Russell for the sale and purchase of real
property titled in their name, without any written document evidencing
either Evan's authority to act of their behalf, or their subsequent
ratification of Evan's acts.
3.

Did the District Court correctly find that notwithstanding

Russell's acts allegedly performed in reliance on an oral agreement
between himself and Evan for the purchase of real property owned by
Drew

and Diana, the statute

of frauds prevented

performance of said oral agreement.

1

the specific

B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

This matter is on appeal from the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Rindlesbach and against Russell.

In

reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the
facts in light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Mountain

States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 192
(Utah 1991).

In deciding whether a district court properly granted

judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing party, the appellate
court reviews the correctness of the trial court's conclusions of law.
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp. , 813 P.2d 104, 197 (Utah 1991).

However, an

appellate court may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any ground
available to the trial court, even if it is not one relief upon below.
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 135 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 25, CHAPTER 5, STATUTE OF FRAUDS
25-5-1.

Estate or interest in real property.

No estate or interest in real property other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or
power over or concerning real property or in any manner
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation
of law, or by deem or conveyance in writing subscribed by
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.
25-5-8.

Right to specific performance not affected.

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed
to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific
performance of agreements in case of part performance
thereof.

2

TITLE 78, CHAPTER 37, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
78-37-6.

Right of redemption - Sales by parcels - Of land and
water stock.

Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of
sales under executions generally. In all cases where the
judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the
court shall equitably apportion such water stock to the
land, or some part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it
may deem suitable for the sale thereof, and the land and
water stock in each parcel shall be sold together, and for
the purpose of such sale shall be regarded as real estate
and subject to redemption as above specified. In all sales
of real estate under foreclosure the court may determine
the parcels and the order in which such parcels of property
shall be sold.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 56(c).

Summary Judgment.

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
RULE 69(j)(3).

Conduct of Sale.

(3)
Conduct of sale. All sales of property under
execution must be made at auction to the highest bidder,
Monday through Saturday, legal holidays excluded, between
the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 8 o'clock p.m.
After
sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution
no more shall be sold.
Neither the officer holding the
execution nor such officer's deputy shall become a
purchaser, or be interested in any purchase at such sale.
When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the
sale.
The sale must be held in a place reasonably
accessible to the general public.
The property must be
3

sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest
price; and when the sale is of real property, consisting of
several known lots or parcels, they must be sold
separately; or when a portion of such real property is
claimed by a third person, and the third person requires it
to be sold separately, such portion must be thus sold. All
sales of real property must be made at the courthouse of
the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is
situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may
also direct the order in which the property, real or
personal, shall be sold, when such property consists of
several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can be
sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow
such directions. The officer shall pay to the judgment
creditor or the attorney for the judgment creditor so much
of the sales proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. any
excess in the proceeds over the judgment and reasonable
accrued costs must be returned to the judgment debtor,
unless otherwise directed by the judgment or the court.
RULE 69(j)(l).

Redemption of real property from sale.

(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed by
the following persons or their successors in interest: (A)
the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having a lien by
judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or
on some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on which
the property was sold.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On

November

18, 1993, Rindlesbach,

who

had

acquired

the

beneficiary's interest in a trust deed encumbering certain real
property owned by Drew and Diana, filed a Complaint seeking judicial
foreclosure of the trust deed.

On January 6, 1994, Russell, who

claimed an interest in the real property pursuant to an oral purchase
agreement, filed an Answer to Rindlesbach's Complaint, together with
a Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third-Party Complaint. On February 17,
1994, Rindlesbach filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the
relief

sought

in

his

Complaint

and

dismissal

of

Russell's

Counterclaim. On June 23, 1994, the District Court entered its Order
4

Granting

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

in

Rindlesbach and also entered a Decree of Foreclosure.

favor of
Following

issuance of an Order of Sale, Rindlesbach purchased the foreclosed
property at a sheriff's sale conducted on August 2, 1994.
On February 2, 1995, Russell filed a Petition for Determination
of Entitlement to Redeem a portion of the foreclosed property and paid
to the Court the redemption price of the foreclosed property.
Rindlesbach objected to Russell's attempted redemption on the grounds
that Russell had no standing to redeem.

Twenty days later, on

February 22, 1995, Rindlesbach commenced a second action, seeking to
quiet title to the foreclosed property and other real property upon
which Russell also asserted a claim.

On March 21, 1995, the

foreclosure action and the quiet title action were consolidated under
the consolidated civil number 930906701. On May 9, 1995, Rindlesbach
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment against all
defendants other than Russell, which was granted by an Order dated
December 22, 1995. On August 11, 1995, Rindlesbach filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment against Russell, which motion was granted by a
separate Order dated December 22, 1995.

Also on December 22, 1995,

the District Court entered its Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in
the real property.

On January 18, 1996, Russell filed his Notice of

Appeal of the Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Defendant Russell and of the Judgment and Decree Quieting Title.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Prior to December 1987, Evan and his spouse, Geneva, held

fee title to certain real property located at approximately 1815 East
5

Creek Road South, Salt Lake City, Utah, consisting of approximately
3.53

acres designated in six separate parcels

Property11).
2.

(the "Creek Road

(Rec. pp. 487, 488).

On November 30, 1987 and December 7, 1987, Evan and Geneva

conveyed the Creek Road Property to Drew and Diana by Quit Claim Deed.
(Rec. pp. 487, 491, 492, 495).
3.

On or August 10, 1993, Rindlesbach, as buyer, and Drew and

Diana and Evan, collectively as sellers, entered into an Earnest Money
Sales Agreement whereby Rindlesbach intended to purchase five of the
six parcels constituting the Creek Road Property. This real property,
consisting of parcels 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 is hereinafter referred to as
the "Contract Property".
4.

(Rec. pp. 415-417, 434-435).

The closing of the sale under the Earnest Money Agreement

was made conditional upon the sellers thereunder clearing title to the
Contract Property. (Rec. pp. 418, 435).
5.

On or about October 26, 1993, Rindlesbach purchased, for

good and valuable consideration, a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note from
Capital City Bank, which Trust Deed encumbered Parcels 1, 3, 5 and 6
of the Creek Road Property, hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Deed
Property."
6.

(Rec. pp. 129-132, 136-155).

On or about November 18, 1993, Rindlesbach initiated a

judicial foreclosure action on the Trust Deed Property by filing a
Complaint in Civil No. 930906701 before the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, Mark Rindlesbach v. Drew William Hansen,
et al. (the "Foreclosure Action").
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(Rec. pp. 1-36).

7.

On June 23, 1994, Judge Michael Murphy entered an Order

Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and a Decree of
Foreclosure in the Foreclosure Action authorizing a Sheriff's Sale of
the Trust Deed Property.
8.

(Rec. pp. 246-249, 250-257).

In his Order, Judge Murphy specifically declared that

Russell was not a "Judgment Debtor" as that term is used in Rule 69,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of designating the
order in which the parcels were to be sold.
9.

(Rec. p. 248).

On August 2, 1994, pursuant to an Order of Sale, the Salt

Lake County Sheriff sold the Trust Deed Property to Rindlesbach, the
highest bidder, for the total sum of $98,036.11 ($10,036.11 for Parcel
1; $58,000.00 for Parcels 3 and 5; and $30,000.00 for Parcel 6).
(Rec. pp. 303-306).
10.

On or about November

17, 1994, for good and valuable

consideration, Drew and Diana executed two separate Quit Claim Deeds
(the "Quit Claim Deeds") whereby Rindlesbach acquired fee title to the
Contract Property from Drew and Diana.
11.

On or about December

(Rec. pp. 496, 502-504, 505).

2, 1994, for good and valuable

consideration, Drew and Diana executed that certain Assignment of
Redemption Rights assigning to Rindlesbach all of their rights to
redeem the Trust Deed Property from the Sheriff's Sale.

(Rec. pp.

704-705).
12.

Russell claims an interest in the Creek Road Property as

evidenced by that certain Notice of Interest dated on or about August
16, 1993, and recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on or about August 16, 1993, as Entry No. 5579822, in
7

Book 6731, at Pages 2762, et seq.,

supplemented by that

certain

Correction Notice of Interest dated on or about August 17, 1993, and
recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
on or about August 17, 1993, as Entry No. 5581629, in Book 6733, at
Pages 1352, et seq. (the "Notice of Interest").
13.

(Rec. pp. 368, 539).

The Notice of Interest relates to an alleged oral real

estate contract entered into between Evan, as seller, and Russell, as
buyer, in the spring of 1991 whereby Russell agreed to purchase and
Evan allegedly agreed to sell a portion of the Contract Property (the
"Oral Contract").
14.

(Rec. p. 368).

Drew and Diana, the fee owners of the Creek Road Property,

never authorized Evan, either orally or in writing, to negotiate for
or consummate a sale of the Creek Road Property either to Russell or
to any other party.
15.

(Rec. pp. 488, 496).

Although a proposed written agreement was drafted, it was

never accepted or signed by the parties.

In fact, Russell refused to

execute the proposed agreement or take title to the property.

(Rec.

pp. 368, 488, 496, 513, 541-544).
16.

Prior to and after the spring of 1991 Russell made periodic

payments either to Evan or for the benefit of the Creek Road Property,
but did not make the payments or fulfill other covenants required in
the proposed agreement.
17.

(Rec. pp. 535, 563-570).

Prior to and after 1991, Russell kept some of his horses on

the Creek Road Property which were cared for in part by Evan, whose
residence remained on the Property.

8

(Rec. pp. 474-478, 536).

18.
business

Prior to and after 1991, Evan and Russell had various
dealings

transactions.
19.

with

each

other,

including

loan

and

sales

(Rec. pp. 460-462).

Russell claims an interest in Parcels 3, 5 and 6 of the

Trust Deed Property by virtue of his Petition for Determination of
Entitlement to Redeem dated February 2, 1995, and the tender of
certain funds into Court in the Foreclosure Action for the purpose of
redeeming those parcels from the Sheriff's Sale.
20.

Rindlesbach

has

objected

to

and

(Rec. p. 369).

continues

to

oppose

Russell/s Petition and attempted redemption and, on February 22, 1995,
filed a Complaint herein seeking to quiet title to the Contract
Property based both on the foreclosure action and his deeds from Drew
and Diana.
21.

(Rec. pp. 328-334).

The claims of each of the Defendants in the quiet title

action other than Russell were resolved by the District Court's Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment
Against Various Defendants.
22.

(Rec. pp. 602-606).

On October 4, 1995, Judge Murphy granted Rindlesbach's

Motion for Summary Judgment against Russell in the quiet title action,
which was finalized in an Order and Judgment and Decree Quieting Title
issued by Judge William A. Thane dated December 22, 1995.

(Rec. pp.

582-587, 588-595).
23.

On January 18, 1996, Russell filed a Notice of Appeal

initiating this proceeding.

(Rec. pp. 654-657).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Following the Sheriff's Sale on the Trust Deed Property, Russell
attempted an eleventh hour redemption of the foreclosed property.
Notwithstanding the prior determination of the District Court that
Russell did not qualify as a judgment debtor, he now seeks to obtain
redemption rights as a successor in interest to the judgment debtor.
This argument is flawed. Russell has failed to demonstrate his right
under Rule 69 (j) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The actual
successor in interest to the Trust Deed Property of Drew and Diana is
Rindlesbach. He purchased not only the fee title interest thereto but
all

rights

of

redemption

as

evidenced

by

recorded

assignment

instruments.
The Creek Road Property has been titled in the joint names of
Drew and Diana since November 30, 1987.

Nevertheless, Russell

negotiated

exclusively with Evan for the purchase of the real

property.

His assertions that Evan was an agent with apparent

authority to act on behalf of Drew and Diana fails because of the
express language of the statute of frauds.

Similarly, Russell's

argument that the action and non-action of Drew and Diana constituted
ratification of Evan's alleged oral contract with Russell similarly
fails because of the Utah courts' extension of the statute of frauds.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995 Repl.).
Finally, Russell's attempt to bypass the responsibilities of the
statute of frauds by asserting his partial performance of the oral
contract does

not meet

recognized in Utah.

the exclusive reference

test generally

Russell's claimed part performance of making
10

periodic payments (in the aggregate substantially less than that
required under the alleged oral agreement)f his placement of his
horses on the property, and assistance in the maintenance of the horse
care area do not indicate performance under the oral contract as the
only reasonable explanation for those actions.

A long history of

lending, commercial transactions, and animal husbandry between Russell
and Evan provide much more likely explanations for their respective
conduct.

This

is particularly

evident

in

light of Russell's

acknowledged refusal to ever execute and consummate the oral agreement
or take title to the property.
Russell's failure to show, as a matter of law, his legal
entitlement to redeem the Trust Deed Property from the foreclosure
sale, and to impose upon the non-contracting fee title owners of the
Creek Road Property, an alleged incomplete oral agreement made with
a non-owner thereof, were good and sufficient grounds for the District
Court to grant Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment. That Order
and the Decree Quieting Title should be affirmed by this Court.
ARGUMENT
I. RUSSELL LACKS THE STATUTORY CAPACITY REQUIRED BY RULE 69 IN ORDER
TO REDEEM PROPERTY FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6 (1992 Repl.) provides that "[s]ales of
real estate under judgments of foreclosure or mortgages and liens are
subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions generally."
The rules governing executions, including Sheriff's Sales, allow only
certain "persons or their successors in interest" to redeem real
property:

"(A) the judgment debtor; [and] (B) a creditor having a
11

lien by judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold . . .
subsequent to that on which the property was sold."
69(j)(l).

Utah R. Civ. P.

These provisions comprise Utah's entire statutory scheme

for the redemption of real property.

Russell's current attempt to

qualify

on the classification

is now focused exclusively

"successor in interest to judgment debtor".

of a

(See Appellant's Brief

at p. 13) .
It is widely recognized "that the right of redemption
. . . [is] a substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with
statutory terms." Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d
1122, 1124 (Utah 1977) (overturning lower court's grant of an extension
of time to redeem as an abuse of discretion) . Such terms include the
determination

of

"classes

that

come

within

[the

statute's]

provisions." 50 C.J.S. Judicial Sales § 37(b) (1947).
The District Court's Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the foreclosure action entered on June 23, 1994
in the Foreclosure Action, included the following finding:
3.
Defendant Russell is not a "Judgment Debtor" as that
term is used in Rule 69(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and is therefore not entitled to make a
designation of the order in which parcels of real property
are to be sold at the anticipated Sheriff's Sale.
(Rec. p. 248) .

This Finding was a result of a hotly contested

argument at the hearing and was based on the undisputed evidence that
there was no written executed agreement whereby Russell claimed his
alleged ownership to the property, neither was there any written
document

establishing

Russell's

financial

responsibility

to

Rindlesbach for payment of Trust Deed Note subject of the foreclosure
12

action.

Russell did not appeal that Order; rather, his counsel

specifically consented to the form and content of the same.

(Rec. p.

249, 733).
Although the term "judgment debtor" is not specifically defined
in Rule 69 or any of its subsections, it is axiomatic that, unless
otherwise defined, identical terms within subsections of the same rule
must have identical meanings.

Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 847 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1993).
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P2d 42, 45
(Utah App. 1988), the Court declared:
Although any judge is free to change his or her mind on the
outcome of a case until a final decision is formally rendered,
. . . the "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay
and to prevent injustice. The purpose of this doctrine is that
in the interest of economy of time and efficiency of procedure,
it is desirable to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in
repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same propositions
in the same case.
In this matter,

the

1994 Order

finding

that Russell was not a

"judgment debtor" was made following a hearing on the issue and was
approved by Russell's counsel and certified as "final" pursuant to
Rule 54(b).

(Rec. p. 248, 249). See also

State v. O'Neil. 848 P2d

694, 697 (Utah App. 1993) and Plumb v. State, 809 P2d 734, 740 (Utah
1990) .

For the same reasons that the Court previously found that

Russell was not a "judgment debtor" for purposes of former Rule
69(e)(3), and in harmony with the "law of the case", Russell should
be precluded from redeeming the Trust Deed Property as a "judgment
debtor" under subsection (j) of the same Rule.
The judgment debtors were Drew and Diana, the obligors on the
note securing the trust deed.

(Rec. pp. 143, 251).
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As judgment

debtors, Drew and Diana retained their right to redeem the Trust Deed
Property from the Sheriff's Sale.

A judgment debtor does not

necessarily require the ownership of property securing the debt.
Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d

77, 78

(Utah 1975).

It is very

significant that the Utah Rule grants the right to redeem to the
"judgment debtor" and its successors, not to the owner of the property
and its successors. The only transfer of redemption rights (which are
interests in real property) from Drew and Diana was accomplished
through the written Assignment of Redemption Rights executed by Drew
and Diana in favor of Rindlesbach.

(Rec. pp. 704-705).

In his Brief, Russell ignores the 1994 Order of Judge Murphy and
relies instead upon a case interpreting the Arizona redemption rule.
In Fortv-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 East Broadway, 660
P.2d 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), the Arizona Appellate Court construed
its statute granting the right of redemption broadly, including
subsequent purchasers of secured real property as persons entitled to
redeem.

That statute is different from Utah's:

Property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold
separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or
their successors in interest:
1.
The judgment debtor or his successor in interest
in the whole or any part of the property*
Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-1282. The Utah Rule does not identify
the "successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property."
Had the Utah lawmakers desired subsequent purchasers of the real
estate to enjoy redemption rights, they would have adopted clear
language similar to Arizona's. Clearly, the purpose of the Utah Rule
is to protect a party obligated for secured debt from an inequitable
14

liquidation of the secured asset for less than fair value, thereby
allowing the judgment debtor to minimize the deficiency judgment
available in Utah.
Of additional significance to the Arizona Court in Forty-Four
Hundred was the distinctions made with a prior Arizona case. In Perry
v. Safety Savings & Loan Association of Kansas City, 544 P.2d 267
(Ariz. App. Ct. 1976), the court held that Perry did not become a
successor in interest under the Arizona statute because he failed to
obtain a "properly acknowledged deed conveying the right of redemption
of the judgment debtors as to the mortgaged premises.
Hundred, 660 p.2d at 869.
obtain a written

Forty-Four

Similar to Perry, Russell has failed to

instrument which could evidence any legal or

equitable interest in either the real property or the right to redeem
same.

Even in Arizona, Russell would necessarily fail in his quest

for judicial approval of his asserted redemption rights. Russell may
not redeem the Trust Deed Property, because he simply does not belong
to either class of redemptioners set forth in Rule 69(j)(l).
II. EVAN'S DEALINGS WITH RUSSELL WERE NOT BINDING UPON DREW AND DIANA
IN ANY ATTEMPT TO SELL THE CONTRACT PROPERTY.
Just as a contract to sell an interest in land is unenforceable
by or against parties who did not sign a written contract, one cannot
serve as an agent for another party whose signature is required on a
real estate contract without written authorization from the principal.
There was no ratification as a matter of law because Utah
Statute of Frauds requires that any agent executing an
agreement conveying an interest in land on behalf of his
principal must be authorized in writing.
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Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 Utah 1982).
§ 25-5-3.

See Utah Code Ann.

It is undisputed that Evan never received a written

authorization from either Drew of Diana to negotiate or execute a
contract with Russell for the sale of their real property.

(Rec. pp.

488, 496) . Thus, pursuant to the Utah statute of frauds, not only was
there no enforceful contract for the sale of the property to Russell,
but there was no effective authorization for Evan to act on behalf of
Drew and Diana in connection with real property.
Since 1987, Drew and Diana have held themselves out to the public
as owners of the fee title to the Creek Road Property as evidenced by
good and valid deeds recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder.
(Rec. pp. 487, 491, 492, 495). Russell's claimed ignorance of that
fact must be attributable to himself.

Furthermore, it is undisputed

that Russell made no effort to confirm the identity of the owner(s)
of the Creek Road Property or the apparent authority of Evan to act
for said owner(s) . Utah law recognized that it is the duty of a buyer
to confirm the authority of an agent to act on behalf of a principal.
The general rule is that one who deals with an agent has
the responsibility to attain the agent's authority despite
the agent's representations.
Bradshaw v. McBride, supra

at 78.

Having failed to comply with the statute of frauds for the sale
of real property and for the designation of Evan as agent to sell real
property, Russell now asserts that the conduct of Drew and Diana
confirmed or ratified Evan's act of selling the Creek Road Property
and somehow overcomes the statute of frauds obstacle.
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In his action

for specific performance, Russell asks this Court to effectively
repeal the statute of frauds.
All of the foregoing principles are well established in Utah.
In the factually similar case

Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P. 2d 74 (Utah

1982) the plaintiffs and defendants owned contiguous parcels of real
property.

One of the eight sibling owners of the McBride property

entered into an oral agreement with Bradshaw to sell Bradshaw the
McBride parcel.
sales price.

Bradshaw in fact paid $5,000.00 of the $33,000.00

He thereafter repaired fences, installed a water line,

and grazed his cattle on the McBride parcel. However, the other seven
sibling owners refused to sell.

The trial court entered a judgment

of specific performance for Bradshaw, but the Utah State Supreme Court
reversed, holding the contract void under the statute of frauds.

The

issues discussed in Bradshaw include lack of a contract signed by the
parties

in

interest,

lack

of

proper

agency

by

the

person

who

negotiated the agreement, lack of proper ratification by the owners,
and lack of sufficient part performance.

These are the same issues

before this Court in the instant case.
With regard to agency, the Court said:
. . . The general rule is that one who deals with an agent
has the responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority
despite the agent's representations. . . . [citing Dohrmann
Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc. . 99 Utah 188, 103
P.2d 650 (1940) Id. at 78.
Furthermore, the Court clearly and unequivocally stated the Utah
law concerning notification as follows:
Furthermore as to all defendants, there was no ratification
as a matter of law because the Utah Statute of Frauds
requires that any agent executing an agreement conveying an
interest in land on behalf of his principal must be
17

authorized in writing. Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 25-5-3 . . .
Where the law requires the authority to be given in
writing, the ratification must also generally be in
writing, [citations omitted].
Id.
A similar result occurred in Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421
(Utah 1986).

Plaintiffs in that case were joint owners of a home.

Defendants offered to buy the home and paid earnest money. There was
no question about the plaintiff wife's intent.

She claimed that she

explicitly authorized her husband to accept on her behalf and fully
intended to be bound to the contract.

The Court held her intent and

verbal authorization ineffective absent a written acceptance or a
written authorization given to the husband to act on her behalf. The
court declared:
One joint tenant or tenant in common cannot bind his
cotenant by a contract which he may make relating to the
common property. . . . [citing Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465
P.2d 356 (1970)].
Thus, even when a party's intent is clear, the lack of written
authorization renders an oral contract for the sale of real property
unenforceable.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that Diana

even knew that Russell had negotiated a contract of sale with Evan
until the sale of the Property to Rindlesbach.

There are no factual

assertions of Drew's knowledge until two years after the alleged oral
argument was made. Under the Utah standard, Evan cannot be deemed an
agent for the fee title owners of the Creek Road Property as a matter
of law, and the oral contract is unenforceable.
Even if Drew and Diana had known all the details about what Evan
was allegedly doing with respect to the sale of the property, their
acquiescence could not serve as a substitute for a properly written
18

agency or as an estoppel to deny agency.
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970).

See, Coombs v. Ouzounian,

Coombs involved an action for

specific performance of an option to purchase the defendants' home.
The defendant husband had signed the option contract but his wife and
joint owner of the property had not.

The plaintiff argued that the

defendant wife was equitably estopped to deny her husband's agency to
sign on her behalf because she knew he had signed the agreement but
did nothing to indicate her lack of consent.

Her lack of action

arguably implied her assent to his acting as her agent.
held the contract void under the statute of frauds.

The Court

Its holding on

the estoppel argument was as follows:
. any contract by a husband affecting the wife's
interest in land is unenforceable against her in the
absence of a written authorization signed by the wife,
since there is no husband-wife exception to the statute of
frauds. The court observed that the wife admitted in her
deposition that she knew her husband was selling the
property to plaintiff and that she intended him to do so.
However, since the wife was not bound by her husband's
action, whatever effect her acquiescence might have been
was ended when she granted her interest in the property to
a third person. Id. at 465. P.2d 358.
In the instant case, Drew and Diana have stated that never
authorized Evan to act on their behalf and they do not consider the
alleged oral agreement between Evan and Russell valid or enforceable.
III. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PREVENTS RUSSELL FROM ASSERTING ANY
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT PROPERTY.
The Utah Statute of Frauds provides that:
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be
created granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same.
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Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995 Repl.).

An express reading of this

statute, by itself, precludes Russell from asserting any ownership
interest in any part of the Creek Road Property.

Russell admits the

absolute absence of any written documents signed by any of the parties
conveying or agreeing to convey the Creek Road Property.

(See

Appellant's Brief at p. 7, 5 7; Rec. p. 732).
However, the Utah Code Annotated §25-5-8 (1995 Repl.) provides
further that "[n]othing in this chapter contained shall be construed
to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of
agreements in case of part performance thereof."

Thus, the relevant

issue becomes whether certain actions of Russell, as a matter of law,
constitute part performance sufficient to recognize the alleged oral
contract notwithstanding the statute of frauds.

Utah courts have

determined what constitutes sufficient part performance generally.
In Martin v. Scholl. 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983), the Court restated the
rule announced in Randall v. Tracy Collins & Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480
(Utah 1956), as follows:
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and
definite; second, the acts done in performance of the
contract must be equally clear and definite; and third, the
acts must be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in
reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been
performed had the contract not existed and (b) the failure
to perform on the part of the promisor would result in
fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be
inadequate.
The element of reliance is of particular importance, especially
when the existence of the oral contract is contested or the oral
contract's terms, as in the present case, lack definiteness. Id. at
276.

In such cases, the acts of reliance must be "exclusively
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referable" to the contract. If the acts "can be explained on another
ground, they are insufficient to remove the bar of the statute of
frauds and the contract is unenforceable." Id. at 277.
In Martinf the trial court found the plaintiff to have entered
into an oral contract with a Mr. Chaff in in 1947, making the following
findings:
Pursuant to the contract, Mr. Chaffin agreed to convey to
plaintiff 120 acres of land if Martin would continue
working as his foreman.
Martin remained, receiving a
salary and occasional raises. . .. From the time Chaffin
and Martin entered into their agreement . . . until
Chaffin's death on July 30, 1975, Martin worked exclusively
for Chaffin as his foreman in reliance upon their agreement
that the subject property would be conveyed to Martin. In
reliance on the agreement, Martin labored 10 to 16 hours
per day, 7 days a week during the summer months and,
occasionally when necessary, worked around the clock. In
the winter time, Martin labored 8 to 10 hours per day, 7
days a week. During this period of time Martin's salary
ranged from $75 per month in 1947, to $375 per month in
1975. From 1960 until 1969, Martin received $325 per month
without a single raise. Additionally . . . Martin and his
wife Martha, provided substantial personal services to
Chaffin and that Martin's son Denny performed farming
operations on Chaffin's farms and ranches for which he was
not compensated. It is further found that these services
would not have been provided but for the agreement between
Chaff in and Martin that the subject property was to be
conveyed to Martin.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court's decision
and held that these acts of alleged reliance by the proposed purchaser
—

labor 10 to 16 hours per day, seven days a week in the summer and

8 to 10 hours per day in the winter —

constituted insufficient part

performance to remove the oral contract from the statute of frauds.
The Court held that the conduct of the plaintiff could have been
reasonably explained on grounds other than the recognition on an oral
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agreement and were therefore not "exclusively referable" to the
contract. Id. at 279.
Similarly, in Price v. Lloyd, 86 P. 767 (Utah 1906), the Court
reversed

a

decedent's

lower court's judgment awarding real property to a
niece

who had

moved

onto decedent's

property, made

improvements thereon and performed personal services for the deceased.
In both Price and Martin, the Court overruled the lower courts'
findings and found that the plaintiffs failed to show their respective
actions could be reasonably explained only by the recognition and
enforcement of a disputed oral contract.
The alleged oral contract between Evan and Russell lacks definite
terms.

(Rec. pp. 478-480).

The proposed written document was never

executed; neither was it followed.

If any oral agreement between

Russell and Evan is to be enforced, Russell must show that his
sporadic payments were actions of reliance and exclusively referable
to the alleged contract.
to that level.

By his admission, his actions do not rise

His own testimony indicates other reasons for his

periodic payments to Evan.

(Rec. pp. 460-462). Russell was a tenant

on the Property. Evan's attorney, Merrill G. Hansen, informed Russell
of the problems due to the failure to finalize any sale of the
Contract Property and characterized the relationship as landlordtenant with animal boarding services.

(Rec. pp. 105-107). Evan kept

and cared for Russell's horses throughout the period when Russell was
allegedly purchasing the Property.

Russell also gave Evan loans at

various times, even preceding the alleged purchase of the Creek Road
Property, without any definite terms of repayment.
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The fact that Evan's family and Drew's family continued to live
in the two homes on the Creek Road Property and that Russell failed
to occupy either home or obtain rent payments for the same further
evidences that Russell did not believe that he owned the Creek Road
Property.

Most importantly, Russell even failed to communicate his

intentions to purchase the Property to the actual owners, Drew and
Diana, until they told Russell of their intent to sell to Rindlesbach.
The alternative explanations for Russell's actions provide the more
than adequate basis to dismiss Russell's attempt to enforce a disputed
oral contract to purchase real property.
In his Brief, Russell places heavy reliance on the recent case,
The Georae Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust v. Fisher,
277 Utah Adv. Rep. 44

(Ut. App. 1995).

In Fisher this Court

recognized an oral modification of a written agreement for the sale
of real property through partial performance.

The subject of the

modification was the timing of payments, and there was support for
some form of modification from both parties.

The issue was limited

to the specific terms being modified.
The instant case is a far different one from Fisher. Here, the
very purpose and existence of the alleged oral agreement is contested.
There is no written agreement between Russell and Drew and Diana which
can be subject to interpretation or oral modification based on the
conduct of the parties.

Unlike Fisher, this case is an example of

exactly the kind of contested conveyance of real property that the
statute of frauds was enacted to prevent.
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CONCLUSION
There are many contested facts in this matter, but none of them
were necessary for the determination of the District Court. Because
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and because
Rindlesbach was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the
District Court properly found (1) that Russell was neither a "judgment
debtor" or a "successor to the judgment debtor, and therefore lacked
the statutory capacity to redeem the Trust Deed Property from the
Sheriffs Sale, (2) that the acts allegedly performed by Russell in
reliance on his asserted oral contract with Evan for the purchase of
real property failed to meet the test of exclusive reference, and (3)
that therefore the statute of frauds prevented the enforcement of
Russell's asserted oral contract. Rindlesbach respectfully urges this
Court to affirm the District Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment against Russell and its Judgment and Decree Quieting
Title.
DATED this

0

day of October, 1996.
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